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FAMILY LAW
Allison Anna Tait *
INTRODUCTION
Once again this year, the Virginia courts and legislature have
been occupied with a range of family law matters—from divorce, to
custody, to support. Spousal support, in particular, has been much
discussed in legislative chambers, as well as in courtrooms, and
significant legislative changes will redesign how divorcing couples
draft settlement agreements in the coming years. In other areas,
there has been less activity and fewer results. Both the House of
Delegates and the Senate of Virginia failed to move out of committee bills that would repeal “the statutory prohibitions on same-sex
marriages and civil unions or other arrangements between persons
of the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges and obligations
of marriage.” 1 Similarly stuck in committee was a bill to repeal the
crime of adultery, and one to make “parenting and marriage terminology gender-neutral in the relevant law regarding adoption.” 2
I. MARRIAGE
A. Getting Married
Last fall, the Supreme Court of Virginia put an end to the saga
of Levick v. MacDougall, a case that had been the source of great

* Associate Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. Thanks to the University
of Richmond Law Review and Emily Palombo for inviting me to write this overview and to
the staff for their excellent editorial work. Thanks also to Hayden-Anne Breedlove for her
research assistance.
1. SB 50 Same-Sex Marriages; Civil Unions, VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., http://lis.vir
ginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?181+sum+SB50 (last visited Oct. 1, 2018); HB 414 Same-Sex
Marriages; Marriage Laws, Gender-Neutral Terms, VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., http://lis.virgin
ia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?ses=181&typ=bil&val=hb414 (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).
2. HB 412 Marriage-Related Criminal Laws; Gender-Neutral Terms, Adultery Repeal,
Penalty, VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?181+sum+HB
412 (last visited Oct. 1, 2018); HB 413 Adoption; Gender-Neutral Terms, VA.’S LEGIS. INFO.
SYS., http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?181+sum+HB413 (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).

81

TAIT 531 (DO NOT DELETE)

82

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

10/18/2018 8:54 AM

[Vol. 53:81

conversation in lower courts and family law circles. 3 The facts of
the case were simple. In December 2002, the couple participated in
a wedding ceremony in their home in the presence of friends and
family. 4 Before officiating the ceremony, the rabbi discovered that
the parties had not obtained a marriage license. 5 The rabbi suggested that the couple could participate in the ceremony that day
if they obtained a marriage license and submitted the marriage
certificate to the rabbi as soon as possible. 6 On January 6, 2003,
Deborah MacDougall (“Deborah”) went to the courthouse with
Richard Levick (“Richard”) to obtain the license and Richard sent
the license to the rabbi. 7 The rabbi, upon receipt of the license, “executed the marriage certificate and verified that the parties were
married on the date of execution, not the prior date of the ceremony
in their home.” 8
Ten years later, facing divorce proceedings, Richard claimed
that the marriage was void ab initio because the proper licensing
procedure had not been followed. 9 On this ground, Richard asserted that he could invalidate a marital agreement requiring him
to pay spousal support and to distribute the marital assets. 10
Richard managed to persuade the circuit court with his reasoning
and that court concluded that the marriage was void ab initio, offering Deborah little to no possibility of recovering any marital
property or receiving support. 11 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia was not persuaded by the void ab initio argument, concluding that the marriage was “merely voidable.” 12 This decision
left Deborah with more property rights, but still with an invalid
marriage and marital agreement. 13 On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, however, things turned out quite differently as the
court decided that the marriage was indeed valid: “We disagree entirely with [Richard’s] reasoning and hold that the marriage was
not voidable or void ab initio.” 14

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See 294 Va. 283, 805 S.E.2d 775 (2017).
Id. at 288, 805 S.E.2d at 777.
Id. at 288, 805 S.E.2d at 777.
Id. at 288, 805 S.E.2d at 777.
Id. at 288–89, 805 S.E.2d at 777.
Id. at 289, 805 S.E.2d at 777.
Id. at 290, 805 S.E.2d at 777–78.
Id. at 288, 805 S.E.2d at 776.
See id. at 288, 805 S.E.2d at 776–77.
Id. at 288, 805 S.E.2d at 776.
See id. at 290, 805 S.E.2d at 778.
Id. at 288, 805 S.E.2d at 776.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia began by grounding its decision
in the policy preference for upholding marriage. 15 Cutting straight
to the core of the matter, the court stated:
We begin our analysis where it will eventually end—with the first
premise of Virginia law governing marriages: “The public policy of Virginia . . . has been to uphold the validity of the marriage status as for
the best interest of society,” . . . and thus, the presumption of the validity of a marriage ranks as “one of the strongest presumptions
known to the law.” 16

As the supreme court commented, the presumption of a valid marriage is a basic and strong presumption in many states as a matter
of history and public policy. 17 Citing a historical treatise on marriage and divorce, the court added: “It will be readily conceded that
English and American tribunals tend, in construing the marriage
acts, to uphold every marriage, if possible, notwithstanding a noncompliance with the literal forms.” 18 Accordingly, based on this
presumption, the court concluded that all of the husband’s arguments failed. 19
Looking at the Virginia Code itself, the court observed that
“nothing in Code § 20-13 expressly indicates that the license and
solemnization requirements must be performed in any particular
order for the marriage to be valid.” 20 In the case at hand, the court
stated that the couple and the officiant all agreed on the solemnization of the marriage and were also in accordance with the plan
to obtain and return the license after the ceremony. 21 By both solemnizing the marriage and agreeing to subsequently send the license to the rabbi, the couple “reasserted their mutual intent to
marry.” 22 The solemnization began, then, with the ceremony and
15. Id. at 291, 805 S.E.2d at 778.
16. Id. at 291, 805 S.E.2d at 778 (citations omitted) (citing Neecham v. Neecham, 183
Va. 681, 686, 33 S.E.2d at 288, 290 (1945); Eldred v. Eldred, 97 Va. 606, 625, 34 S.E. 477,
484 (1899)) .
17. Id. at 291, 805 S.E.2d at 778.
18. Id. at 291, 805 S.E.2d at 778 (citing 2 JAMES SCHOULER & ARTHUR W. BLAKEMORE,
A Treatise on the Law of Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations § 1191, at
1446 (6th ed. 1921)).
19. Id. at 291, 805 S.E.2d at 778.
20. Id. at 292, 805 S.E.2d at 779. “Every marriage in this Commonwealth shall be under
a license and solemnized in the manner herein provided.” VA. CODE ANN. § 20-13 (Repl. Vol.
2016 & Supp. 2017). “That is a rather slow start, however, because there is no specific ‘manner herein provided’ anywhere in the Code of Virginia.” Levick, 294 Va. at 292, 805 S.E.2d
at 779.
21. Id. at 292, 805 S.E.2d at 779.
22. Id. at 292, 805 S.E.2d at 779.
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terminated when the rabbi executed the marriage certificate. 23
This procedure, the court remarked, might have been “unconventional” but it was not “unlawful.” 24 It would only have been unlawful, the supreme court added, if the legislature had expressly forbidden it. 25 This, the court stated, was not the case: “The
legislature . . . has chosen not to micromanage the details of solemnization. Nor have we.” 26
Addressing the results of both the lower court decision and the
dissenting opinion favoring the void ab initio theory, the supreme
court remarked that such reasoning was not only erroneous, but
also “particularly harsh” to the wife:
The dissent’s view . . . would treat her multi-year investment over the
course of her marriage as irrelevant. She could not enforce the marital
agreement, in which Levick agreed to pay her $150,000 in spousal
support annually, pay for her health insurance premiums, divide
equally the proceeds from the sale of the marital home, and, in the
event that Levick sold his company, provide her with 35% of the proceeds. Nor would she, for that matter, have any other right to seek
spousal support or to request a fair apportionment of marital property
. . . . 27

Not only did public policy dictate the presumption of a valid marriage, equity leaned toward validating the marital agreement, as
well as granting Deborah property rights. 28
B. Prenuptial and Postnuptial Agreements
It is a truism, taught in family law classes, that courts rarely
find prenuptial agreements to be unenforceable. However, Chapin
v. Chapin proves this wisdom wrong. 29 In Chapin, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that a prenuptial agreement was unenforceable on the grounds of unconscionability. 30 The couple in question,
23. Id. at 292, 805 S.E.2d at 779. The marriage therefore began when the rabbi executed
the marriage certificate because “he was ‘completing’ their solemnization agreement that
began with the ceremony and ended when he received the marriage register and executed
the marriage certificate.” Id. at 292, 805 S.E.2d at 779.
24. Id. at 292, 805 S.E.2d at 779.
25. Id. at 292, 805 S.E.2d at 779.
26. Id. at 292, 805 S.E.2d at 779.
27. See id. at 301, 805 S.E.2d at 784.
28. Id. at 291, 301, 805 S.E.2d at 778, 784.
29. See No. 1541-15-4, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 225, at *35 (Aug. 29, 2017) (unpublished
decision).
30. Id. at *4. It was held unenforceable pursuant to Virginia Code section 20-151. Id.
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Ekaterina Chapin (“Ekaterina”) and Bryan Chapin (“Bryan”), met
in 2001 through an “online agency that pairs American men with
Russian women for potential marriage.” 31 The two met in person
on several occasions and in the fall of 2001, Ekaterina moved to
Virginia on a “fiancé-visa” for the purpose of marrying Bryan. 32
Prior to the marriage, Bryan requested that Ekaterina sign a
prenuptial agreement. 33 The agreement “reserved to each party
their separate property, allowed [husband] to protect his retirement savings and children’s inheritances, and waived spousal support.” 34 Both parties disclosed their financial information, with
Bryan valuing his assets at a total of $1,795,800 and Ekaterina
valuing her total worth at $500. 35 The couple’s marriage lasted ten
years, at which point Ekaterina moved out of their marital home
and, two years later, filed for divorce. 36 Ekaterina sought equitable
distribution of their marital assets and spousal support at that
time, and Bryan claimed that the prenuptial agreement barred
Ekaterina from receiving either equitable distribution or spousal
support. 37 Ekaterina, at that point, moved to have the agreement
set aside as unenforceable. 38
In support of her request to set aside the agreement, Ekaterina
testified at a pretrial hearing that she was not provided with a copy
of the prenuptial agreement in Russian and that she “did not understand the legal terms of the agreement or its waiver.” 39 She testified that she never reviewed the agreement with a lawyer because she could not afford one. 40 Moreover, Bryan testified that he
made no offer of financial assistance to ensure that Ekaterina understood the terms of the agreement. 41 The trial court, emphasizing the disparity in assets between the parties that “shock[ed] the

31. Id. at *1.
32. Id. at *2.
33. Id.
34. Id. (alteration in original).
35. Id. (“Neither party disclosed any income or liabilities. In 2001, husband’s liabilities
totaled $545,974.76. If husband’s liabilities (in addition to his total adjusted gross income
of $46,131) had been factored into the total value of his assets, the total value would have
been $1,295,956.44.”).
36. Id. at *3.
37. Id.
38. Id. at *3–4.
39. Id. at *3.
40. Id. at *3–4.
41. Id. at *4.
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conscience” and Ekaterina’s “limited English vocabulary,” concluded that the terms of the agreement were unconscionable. 42 Unfortunately for Ekaterina, even though she prevailed and had the
prenuptial agreement invalidated, she lost on a number of other
claims concerning characterization and valuation of marital property, leaving her with barely $500 as her portion of marital property. 43
II. DIVORCE
A. Getting Divorced
One of the cases this year concerning divorce involved the question of bifurcation—granting the divorce without settling matters
pertaining to property and support—when a husband’s failing
health was an issue. In Friedman v. Smith, Gerald Friedman
(“Gerald”) and Nancy Friedman (“Nancy”) sought a divorce after
fifty-four years of marriage. 44 Married in 1961, the couple lived together until December 2015, when Nancy left their marital home
and subsequently filed for divorce on the grounds of cruelty and
both actual and constructive desertion. 45 Gerald filed a cross-complaint seeking divorce on the grounds of adultery and desertion
and requesting spousal support, use of the marital home, and that
Nancy “be required to return all assets and company interests that
she obtained fraudulently.” 46 Over the next year, the parties filed

42. Id. at *4–5. A prenuptial agreement is found to be unenforceable pursuant to Virginia Code section 20-151 if the person against whom enforcement is sought proves:
(1) Execution of agreement was not voluntary, or
(2) The agreement was unconscionable upon execution and prior to execution,
the person
a. Was not provided fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or
financial obligations of the other party, and
b. Did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond
the disclosure involved.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-151 (Repl. Vol. 2016).
43. See Chapin, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 225, at *18, *11, *29. The husband’s expert witness testified that only $909 in assets were marital. Id. at *10. The remaining assets were
traceable as separate, belonging only to the husband, as they were acquired before the marriage. Id. at *9–10. The court agreed. Id. at *29.
44. 68 Va. App. 529, 534, 810 S.E.2d 912, 914 (2018).
45. Id. at 534, 810 S.E.2d at 914.
46. Id. at 535, 810 S.E.2d at 914.
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numerous motions and the process was “best described as a contentious and protracted dispute between the parties.” 47
On July 13, 2017, Gerald filed a “Motion to Bifurcate Trial and
for Entry of a Decree of Divorce” stating that, at the age of ninety,
his “health . . . [was] such that he may not survive protracted litigation.” 48 He added that Nancy’s conduct seemed “calculated to
purposefully and unreasonably delay this matter with the hope
that [Gerald would] not survive to see his divorce finalized so that
[Nancy would] benefit financially.” 49 At a circuit court hearing on
the matter, both parties admitted that Gerald had been recently
hospitalized for tests and treatment subsequent to a stroke, and
Gerald stated that he “feared his imminent death.” 50 Based on this
information, the circuit court granted the bifurcation, stating that
“the [husband] is ninety and his health is declining and he has been
receiving daily assistance since the start of this instant matter,
and that there have been delays by the parties in this instant matter.” 51 The circuit court granted Gerald’s divorce petition on the
grounds of a one-year separation pursuant to Virginia Code section
20-91(A)(9)(a) while noting: “‘[T]his case is bifurcated as the Court
has found that it is clearly necessary to divorce the parties and reserve certain issues’ for future adjudication,” including spousal
support and equitable distribution. 52 Nancy appealed. 53
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia turned to a plain
reading of the relevant Virginia Code section, which stated: “[T]he
court, on the motion of either party, may retain jurisdiction in the
final decree of divorce to adjudicate the remedy provided by this
section when the court determines that such action is clearly necessary . . . .” 54 The court of appeals continued by remarking that it
was clearly the General Assembly’s intention to grant discretion to
the circuit court “to effectively finalize the issue of divorce from the

47. Id. at 535, 810 S.E.2d at 914.
48. Id. at 535, 810 S.E.2d at 914.
49. Id. at 535, 810 S.E.2d at 914–15.
50. Id. at 535, 810 S.E.2d at 915.
51. Id. at 542, 810 S.E.2d at 918 (alteration in original). The court also pointed out that
there were issues concerning Gerald’s competency and, for that reason, appointed a guardian ad litem. Id. at 536, 810 S.E.2d at 915.
52. Id. at 537, 810 S.E.2d at 915–16 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(A)(9)(a) (Repl. Vol.
2016 & Supp. 2017)).
53. Id. at 537, 810 S.E.2d at 916.
54. Id. at 539, 810 S.E.2d at 916 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2016
& Supp. 2017)).
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bond of matrimony independent of other ancillary issues, such as
equitable distribution and support, and adjudicate them separately—effectively transforming one case into two.” 55 Concluding
that the bifurcation was appropriate and not an abuse of the circuit
court’s discretion, the appellate court ended by underscoring the
fact that “bifurcating a divorce proceeding in this manner is not a
matter of right nor should it be a common practice, but rather an
exercise of a trial court’s discretion in an irregular situation . . . to
achieve equity.” 56 Gerald and Nancy’s case, with Gerald in failing
health and of advanced age, was just such a case. 57
B. Equitable Distribution
In the realm of equitable distribution, one case in particular
demonstrated the importance of good record keeping. Hvozdovic v.
McGuire involved a number of issues, but at the core of the dispute
was the characterization of the husband’s stock. 58 John Hvozdovic
(“John”) and Sarah McGuire (“Sarah”) were married on February
14, 1988, and they had two children. 59
Before marriage, John used part of his salary to acquire stock in
his employer’s company through an employee stock purchase program. 60 From 1984 to February 1988, he acquired 310 shares of his
company’s stock (“M/A-COM”) through the program and purchased
an additional 400 shares through a brokerage firm. 61 Two weeks
prior to marriage, he acquired an additional 194 shares so that he
held a total of 904 shares when he married. 62 After the marriage,
John purchased a total of 764 additional shares in 1989 and 1990
and then, in 1991, he sold over 1600 shares of M/A-COM stock to
purchase 500 shares of Qualcomm stock. 63 The Qualcomm stock
eventually went into John’s Ameriprise SmartTrade account

55.
56.
57.
58.
sion).
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 539–40, 810 S.E.2d at 917.
Id. at 540, 810 S.E.2d at 917.
Id. at 542–43, 810 S.E.2d at 918.
No. 1146-17-4, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 51, at *6 (Feb. 27, 2018) (unpublished deciId. at *1–2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3–4.
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(“Ameriprise Account”). 64 During the marriage, John also participated in a second employee stock purchase plan (“SAIC”) and he
bought stock in that company until 2011, when the company
split. 65 Because of this split, John’s stock was divided into shares
of SAIC stock and Leidos stock. 66 Finally, John also contributed to
a 401(k) through his employment, and in July 2014, he withdrew
the total amount in this account, approximately $459,621, and deposited the funds in a Fidelity IRA account. 67
The couple separated in November 2002 and reached a separation agreement in May 2003. 68 The parties agreed, for the most
part, about which properties were subject to equitable distribution
and their values. 69 In dispute, however, was the characterization
of the Qualcomm, SAIC, and Leidos stock as well as the Fidelity
IRA, all of which John claimed was separate property. 70 At trial,
John testified that he purchased 500 shares of the Qualcomm stock
the same day he sold the M/A-COM shares and that, prior to purchase, the M/A-COM stock was paying dividends. 71 All those dividends were deposited in the couple’s joint checking account. 72
Moreover, John testified that the dividends went “to pay groceries
or rent or whatever.” 73 John agreed when Sarah’s lawyer asked:
“Whenever money was put into your joint marital account, you
deemed that to be used for marital purposes, correct?” 74 John testified that he could not recall the value of the Qualcomm shares,
when he started receiving dividends on those shares, or when he
purchased additional shares. 75 In addition, Sarah testified that
during the marriage, John asked her approval to purchase $2000
of Qualcomm stock with marital funds and she agreed to the purchase. 76 Regarding the SAIC and Leidos stock, John could not identify the value of any separate portion and, similarly, he could not
64. Id. at *4.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *4–5.
68. Id. at *2.
69. Id. at *5.
70. Id. at *17, *19, *22–23.
71. Id. at *9–10.
72. Id. at *10.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at *10–11.
76. Id. at *11.
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recall either the premarital or date-of-separation value of the
401(k) funds used to create the Fidelity IRA. 77
The trial court issued a ruling in June 2017 and classified all the
stock and IRA funds as marital mainly because John did not meet
his burden of tracing separate property. 78 The court concluded that
the Qualcomm stock was all marital based on John’s “inability to
show ‘how many shares of the current Qualcomm stock was separate property’ or ‘to trace those from the initial funds invested.’” 79
Similarly, with the SAIC and Leidos stock, the court found that
marital property and separate property had been commingled; as
a result, all the stock became marital in the absence of any tracing
of separate property. 80 The court also deemed the Fidelity IRA to
be marital property because it was “a rollover account from a prior,
marital account” and, once again, John was not able to “identify
the value of any separate share.” 81 John appealed this ruling, but
on appeal the court affirmed the lower court ruling, reiterating
that the ruling had everything to do with John’s inability to produce any records to help trace his separate property: “Husband,
citing a lack of recordkeeping over the lengthy time period, was
unable to establish the value of the stock at the relevant intervals
that might allow the trial court to determine a separate property
value as distinguished from the presumptively marital whole.” 82
An interesting twist to the story was Sarah’s claim that John
engaged in financial waste when he withdrew funds from the
Ameriprise account (holding the Qualcomm stock and no other asset) to pay for educational expenses for their son. 83 In 2016, the
couple’s son began a two-year master’s program for student advisement. 84 John paid for the son’s tuition and living expenses with
funds taken from the Ameriprise account without consulting with
Sarah. 85 Sarah claimed that the use of these funds to pay for the

77. Id. at *11–12. When John was asked the “monetary value of the separate portion”
that contributed to the new SAIC stock, his answer was “zero.” Id.
78. Id. at *13–14.
79. Id. at *14–15.
80. See id. at *20–23.
81. Id. at *14.
82. Id. at *1, *18–19.
83. Id. at *6, *11.
84. Id. at *5.
85. Id.
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son’s expenses constituted waste—and the trial court agreed. 86 The
circuit court stated:
[I]t is significant that this was an adult child, and you all have been
talking about marital purposes, and I would view hoping that your
adult son gets a degree to be a paternal purpose as opposed to a marital purpose. There is no legal obligation, and the father took the funds
without consultation with the mother, and I don’t think that this is
even really close, in my mind, that this is, in fact, waste, and that’s
the ruling I make. 87

On appeal, the court affirmed this finding of waste, concluding
that not only were the funds fully marital funds, but also that John
had failed to meet his burden of proving the funds were used “for a
proper purpose.” 88 The use of the funds to pay for an adult child’s
educational expenses was not per se financial waste, the court remarked. 89 Here, however, the trial court had found that neither
John nor Sarah was under a legal obligation to pay for the postsecondary education of their adult children. 90 The couple’s separation agreement made no mention of these expenses and, perhaps
most importantly, John had “unilaterally decided to use a marital
asset to make the tuition payments.” 91 Because of the facts of the
situation, the trial court had not erred. 92 Ultimately, then, all of
John’s stock was marital property because of his failure to keep
records and his expenditures on his son were determined to be
waste, or the dissipation of marital assets, likely because he failed
to consult with his wife. 93
In another equitable distribution case, Frakes v. Frakes, the asset in question was not stock, but real estate. 94 The case turned on
questions about a home that the couple owned before divorce. 95
Jane Frakes (“Jane”) and Danny Frakes (”Danny”) were married
in August 2010 in South Dakota, and shortly after their marriage

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
sion).
95.

Id. at *6, *12.
Id. at *12–13.
Id. at *28, *30.
Id. at *28–29.
Id. at *28.
Id.
Id. at *29–30.
Id. at *18–19, *28.
No. 1951-16-1, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 191, at *1 (Aug. 1, 2017) (unpublished deciId. at *2.
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they moved to Norfolk, Virginia. 96 The marriage lasted until January 2014, at which point Jane moved out of the marital home, and
the year after her departure the court granted a divorce on the
grounds of her desertion. 97
The conflict arose over a home in Michigan that Jane contended
was marital property. 98 Danny had inherited the home from his
mother in 2000, well before they were married. 99 However, in 2013,
the couple executed a quit-claim deed that “essentially transferred
title in the property to themselves.” 100 Jane and Danny were listed
as the grantors and the grantees. 101 At trial, Danny testified that
Jane “had asked to be added to the deed to eliminate any doubt
that the property would pass to her if he died.” 102 He testified that
he had not realized he was conveying a present interest in the property to Jane and that “he did not understand the difference between a gift and other types of transfers.” 103 The court was persuaded by this testimony and concluded that Danny had intended
to make an estate plan rather than an inter vivos gift. 104 Accordingly, the court determined that the home was separate property,
despite the names on the deed. 105
Jane appealed the decision, claiming that the court mischaracterized the property after improperly allowing Danny’s parol evidence that he did not have donative intent. 106 The court of appeals
recognized that, in general, “‘property titled in the names of both
parties, whether as joint tenants, tenants by the entirety or otherwise,’ is classified as marital property subject to equitable distribution.” 107 The court noted, however, that the Virginia Code provided an exception for “retitled separate property if it is traceable
by ‘a preponderance of the evidence and was not a gift.’” 108 Looking
at the deed, the court focused on the fact that the document listed

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6–7.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *6–7 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Supp. 2017)).
Id. at *7 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d) (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Supp. 2017)).
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Jane and Danny together both as grantors and grantees. 109 “Thus,”
the court stated, “[I]t is impossible to tell from the face of the instrument whether any new interest was conveyed to wife, let alone
whether such transfer was a gift.” 110 Relying on Michigan law, the
court concluded that “without a transfer apparent from the face of
the document,” there could be no clarity concerning Danny’s donative intent. 111 Moreover, since the deed did not clearly show a donative transfer, the parol evidence rule did not bar Danny’s testimony about his intent in retitling the property. 112 Against
presumption, then, Danny retained the Michigan home as separate
property. 113
C. Spousal Support
1. Significant Legislative Decisions
One of the most important legislative changes this year involved
spousal support and its modifiability. The legislature approved an
amendment to Virginia Code section 20-109(C) stating that no request for a modification of spousal support will be denied without
a hearing, unless the agreement directly states that the spousal
support award is nonmodifiable. 114 That is to say, after this amendment, a spousal support agreement must affirmatively state that
spousal support is nonmodifiable in order to make it nonmodifiable. 115 The new rule applies to all contracts written or executed on
or after July 1, 2018. 116 Specifically, the contract must state: “The
amount or duration of spousal support contained in this [Agreement] is not modifiable except as specifically set forth in this
[Agreement].” 117 Without this language, spousal support will be
presumptively modifiable. 118

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at *8.
Id.
Id. at *8–9.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *7, *12.
See Act of Mar. 30, 2018, ch. 701, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-109(C) (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
115. See id. ch. 701, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
116. Id. ch. 701, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
117. Id. ch. 701, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
118. See id. ch. 701, 2018 Va. Acts at __.
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In other changes to spousal support, the legislature seemed to
take note of an aging population and problems surrounding
spousal support and retirement. Senate Bill 540 amended Virginia
Code section 20-107.1 119 and section 20-109 120 by requiring that
any spousal support order, or reservation for spousal support, must
state whether the court considered retirement—and, if so, what
factors concerning retirement were considered. Two new subsections were added to section 20-109, one (E) stating that a payor
spouse reaching the age for maximum payment of Social Security
benefits (currently age sixty-seven) constitutes a material change
in circumstance. 121 The mere fact that a payor spouse reaches this
age does not mean there will be an automatic modification of
spousal support. 122 Rather, attaining the stated age offers the opportunity for modification. 123 The other new subsection, (F), outlines what the trial court may and/or should consider when ruling
on a modification for spousal support based on the payor spouse’s
retirement. 124 Subsection (F) states that a trial court may consider
the factors set forth in section 20-107.1(E) as well as some new factors that include:
1. Whether retirement was contemplated by the court and specifically
considered by the court when the spousal support was awarded;
2. Whether the retirement is mandatory or voluntary, and the terms
and conditions related to such retirement;
3. Whether the retirement would result in a change in the income of
either the payor or the payee spouse;
4. The age and health of the parties;
5. The duration and amount of spousal support already paid; and
6. The assets or property interest of each of the parties during the
period from the date of the support order and up to the date of the
hearing on modification or termination. 125

119. Act of Mar. 30, 2018, ch. 583, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-107.1(F) (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
120. Id. ch. 583, 2018 Va. Acts at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109(E)–
(G) (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109(E) (Cum. Supp. 2018); see 42 U.S.C. § 416(l)(1)(A) (2012)
(stating that sixty-seven is the current age of retirement).
122. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109(E) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
123. See id.
124. See id. § 20-109(F) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
125. Id. Factor six is significant, as it requires the court to consider the assets or property
interests of each party from the date of the initial hearing to the date of the modification
hearing. Id. § 20-109(F)(6) (Cum. Supp. 2018). This factor reverses Driscoll v. Hunter, a 2011
Virginia case, which held that only the payor spouse’s assets could be considered by the
court in support modification upon retirement. 59 Va. App. 22, 716 S.E.2d 477 (2011). Therefore, it is important to note that the court now must consider the assets or property interests
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Upon retirement, then, payors will now have new opportunities
to request modification based on changes in income brought about
by retirement. 126 Alternately, for older individuals receiving
spousal support, this brings a new possibility that the support they
are receiving could be reduced when they might need it the most.
2. Significant Judicial Decisions
In addition to the legislative time and attention paid to the issue
of spousal support, court dockets were also replete with spousal
support cases. Notable cases included all aspects of support from
the awarding to the modification.
a. Awarding Spousal Support
One issue with respect to awarding spousal support involved the
question of proving ability to pay and the burden placed on the person seeking support. In Collard v. Collins, the couple was married
for almost thirteen years before separating in 2012. 127 When the
wife, Patricia Collins (“Patricia”), filed her complaint for divorce,
she requested and was awarded pendente lite support. 128 Her husband, Reginald Collard (“Reginald”), was obligated to pay her
“rent, electric bill, DirecTV bill, car loan payment, and car insurance payment.” 129 The pendente lite order “expressly stated that
these payments were not intended to be construed as spousal support payments” and “that its terms had ‘no presumptive effect.’” 130
At trial, Patricia represented herself and presented her evidence
by “submitting a folder of documents to the circuit court.” 131 The
documents included her written testimony, as well as information
about her monthly income and expenses. 132 More importantly, she
did not include anything that established her husband’s income or

of each
2018).
126.
127.
sion).
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

party, not just the payor spouse. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109(F)(6) (Cum. Supp.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109(F)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
No. 0406-17-4, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 281, at *2 (Nov. 14, 2017) (unpublished deciId.
Id.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
Id.
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ability to pay any spousal support. 133 The circuit court noted that
the parties had presented “limited” evidence with respect to their
financial situations and that neither one had actually established
Reginald’s ability to pay. 134 The court did, however, note that he
had been paying the pendente lite support as ordered. 135 On this
basis, the court ultimately ordered Reginald to pay $2625 per
month in spousal support, a decision that he appealed, claiming
that Patricia had failed to establish that he had the ability to pay
this amount. 136
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia began by reiterating
that: “A party seeking spousal support bears the burden of proving
all facts necessary for an award.” 137 From there, the court stated
that Patricia had clearly failed to “present any evidence establishing [Reginald’s] income or his ability to pay [the] spousal support”
award at issue. 138 Moreover, the court stated, the pendente lite
award was incorrectly used by the circuit court as a measure of
Reginald’s ability to pay spousal support. 139 The court noted that
“[n]umerous circumstances could have changed between the entry
of the pendente lite order and the final spousal support decision,
and [Reginald’s] ability to pay may have changed drastically.” 140
The appellate court concluded that the circuit court had abused its
discretion and therefore reversed the decision. 141 Patricia was denied her spousal support and, it is possible to speculate, was penalized for her failure or inability to procure legal counsel who
could have instructed her as to what evidence to present to the
court. 142
A second case about the amount of a spousal support award also
involved a long-term marriage and a great asymmetry of incomes.
In Gordon v. Gordon, the couple married in 1985 and was together
133. Id.
134. Id. at *4.
135. Id.
136. Id. at *5.
137. Id. (quoting Robbins v. Robbins, 48 Va. App. 466, 484, 632 S.E.2d 615, 624 (2006)).
138. Id. at *6. All of the evidence that Patricia presented focused on her own financial
needs, and the evidence presented by Reginald did not address his financial circumstances
or ability to pay spousal support. Id. at *3–4. Although the evidence established that Reginald’s owned a construction business, Patricia did not provide any evidence regarding Reginald’s income or the financial condition of his business. Id. at *6–7.
139. Id. at *6–7.
140. Id. at *8–9.
141. Id. at *10.
142. See id. at *9.
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for approximately twenty-seven years before separating and divorcing. 143 The husband, George Gordon (“George”), was a financial
advisor who earned “a lucrative income,” ranging annually from
$366,431 to $898,549. 144 Elizabeth Gordon (“Elizabeth”), the wife,
did not work after the birth of their first child, except sometimes
as a seasonal, part-time volleyball coach. 145
At trial, there was extensive testimony about Elizabeth’s job prospects and her financial situation postdivorce. 146 She testified that
she was in the process of learning ballroom dancing so that she
could potentially obtain employment as an instructor at a rate of
$20 an hour. 147 A vocational expert testified that Elizabeth’s annual earning capacity was somewhere between $24,000 and
$29,000. 148 He also testified that any skills she had acquired from
previous employment as a technical illustrator were obsolete, although he did state that her extensive volunteer experience was
likely “valuable.” 149 The expert suggested that, with her lack of
skills and expertise, Elizabeth was employable most likely as a retail clerk or member services representative. 150 In addition, a financial advisor testified that if Elizabeth received $1.5 million in
equitable distribution assets, “she could expect to withdraw
$65,000 annually, after taxes.” 151 Furthermore, he testified that
withdrawing that sum annually would deplete Elizabeth’s savings
entirely by the age of ninety-five. 152 Based in part on this testimony, the circuit court awarded Elizabeth $2.25 million in equitable distribution property and $12,000 a month in spousal support. 153
George, displeased with this amount of spousal support, appealed the decision, claiming that the circuit court did not properly
consider his wife’s equitable distribution assets, improperly de-

143.
sion).
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

No. 2038-16-2, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 164, at *1 (July 11, 2017) (unpublished deciId. at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
See id. at *1–3.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
See id. at *4.
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clined to impute income to Elizabeth, and ultimately awarded excessive spousal support in light of Elizabeth’s needs. 154 None of
these claims persuaded the appellate court. 155 The court of appeals
stated that the trial court had, in all ways, considered the appropriate factors, balanced the equities, and reached an amount of
spousal support that was not an abuse of discretion. 156
For example, the appellate court remarked that the court had
taken into consideration not only that the husband’s adultery was
a significant factor in the breakdown of the marriage, but also that
“the wife ‘enabled [her husband’s] monetary contributions to grow
into significant amounts by remaining home to take care of the
parties’ child and by willingly living a modest lifestyle when the
parties had sufficient income to have lived a more extravagant lifestyle.” 157 Moreover, the court did not impute employment income
to Elizabeth “due to her long and mutually-agreed-upon absence
from the workforce and her unsuccessful efforts to find meaningful
employment after the parties’ separation.” 158
The court also addressed the question of the equitable distribution property that Elizabeth received, explaining that
The purpose of equitable distribution is to divide the marital estate
“between spouses based upon each spouse’s contribution to the acquisition, preservation, or improvement of property obtained during the
marriage.” In contrast, in determining spousal support, a circuit court
must “consider the equities between the parties” as well as “[t]he
standard of living established during the marriage.” 159

Again, the court of appeals remarked that the equitable distribution was a factor in the consideration, but the trial court had
been within its discretion to take note of the expert testimony that
Elizabeth would have to essentially liquidate all of her assets, at
some point, in order to cover basic needs and expenses. 160 The appellate court found that the circuit court had weighed the appropriate factors in a proper way. 161 What had happened, the appellate court concluded, was that the circuit court “simply did not

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *16–17.
See id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5,
Id. at *8 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Id. at *8–11.
Id.
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assign the weight to those circumstances that the husband requested.” 162 And, the court added: “The contention that the court
‘should have weighed the evidence differently than it did . . . is not
a proper appellate argument.’” 163
b. Modification of Awards
In addition to questions concerning spousal support awards,
modification of these awards was also a frequent subject of contestation. In Davis v. Davis, the court addressed the question of income versus wealth in the modification of spousal support. 164
When the couple, Brian Davis (“Brian”) and Meryl Davis
(“Meryl”), divorced in 2009, each party received over $800,000 in
equitable distribution. 165 After the divorce, Brian’s assets increased to approximately $1.1 million and Meryl’s decreased to approximately $700,000. 166 The court also awarded Meryl spousal
support in the amount of $5100 per month. 167 At the time of the
final divorce decree, Brian was earning about $18,000 per month
in wages, while Meryl was not earning any income other than disability payments she began receiving in September 2008. 168 In
2013, Brian was laid off from his job, and the next year he was
diagnosed with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma and advanced stage retinitis pigmentosa. 169 He also began to receive disability payments
and, based on this change in income, he petitioned the court for
modification of his spousal support. 170
The trial court found that Brian met his initial burden of showing a material change in circumstances and “[a]fter considering the
assets, income, and needs of both parties,” the trial court reduced
Brian’s monthly support obligation from $5100 to $3500. 171 Not
satisfied with this reduction, Brian appealed. 172 On appeal, he
162.
163.
164.
cision).
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at *9.
Id.
No. 0703-17-4, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 313, at *1–2 (Dec. 12, 2017) (unpublished deId.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1.
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claimed that the trial court failed to consider and appreciate the
fact that he was going to be required to invade his assets to pay the
required support obligation, and that the payment of the support
would deplete all of his assets. 173 The Court of Appeals, however,
was not persuaded. 174 It explained that the trial court had properly
considered all the circumstances and that the trial court was not
plainly wrong when it concluded that, although Brian clearly suffered a loss in income, he still “had significant assets” as well as
expenses that he could reduce. 175 This was necessary, the trial
court had added, because Meryl’s financial needs continued to exceed her income even with her disability payments. 176 The “crucial
question,” the appellate court remarked, was:
[T]he ability of the supporting spouse to pay. Husband’s ability to pay
was undisputed. The fact that the payor husband may have to draw
from other sources, such as the principal of investment or savings accounts, in order to make his spousal support payment does not by itself require the trial court to suspend or reduce his spousal support
obligation. 177

Brian further argued that the continued payment of his spousal
support obligation would render him bankrupt. 178 The appellate
court was not sympathetic, stating that “the trial court must base
its modification decisions on the circumstance within the immediate or reasonably foreseeable future, not on what may happen in
the future.” 179 There was, consequently, no further modification
made to Brian’s spousal support obligation. 180
Similarly, in Giambattista v. Giambattista, a change in income
did not necessarily mean a reduction in support. 181 In that case,
Julie Giambattista (“Julie”) and Scott Giambattista (“Scott”) were
married for almost twenty-two years before they separated in February 2010. 182 While they were married, Julie worked at home:

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
cision).
182.

Id. at *6.
Id. at *7–8.
Id. at *5–6, *9–10.
See id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7–8.
See id. at *10.
No. 1043-17-14, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 63, at *6–7 (Mar. 13, 2018) (unpublished deId. at *1.
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“She managed the household, dealt with the majority of the children’s schoolwork, cooked meals for the family, sorted and paid the
bills, shopped, and cleaned.” 183 Scott was the primary earner and
worked for the United States Secret Service. 184 “For the majority
of his career, he was a member of the Rapid Response team, an
entity within the Secret Service posted at the White House and
responsible for responding to security threats.” 185
When the couple’s divorce was finalized in December 2012, the
Property Settlement Agreement (“PSA”) provided that Scott would
pay $3100 monthly in spousal support. 186 Moreover, the PSA also
stated that Scott would make these payments “until modified by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon appropriate petition filed by
either party based upon a material change of circumstances, such
as, but not limited to, [Scott’s] retirement from the United States
Secret Service.” 187
For two years after the divorce, Scott earned approximately
$140,000, and in 2015 he earned approximately $160,000. 188 However, starting in 2014 he was having difficulty “maintaining the
necessary physical standards to remain on the team,” and in 2015
he was required to take part in “remedial training.” 189 Scott felt
that his age was becoming a liability, “characterizing himself as a
‘dinosaur’ in comparison with the younger members of the
team.” 190 Accordingly, he retired from the Secret Service in 2016 at
the age of fifty-six—one year before he would have been subject to
mandatory retirement. 191
Before retiring, Scott obtained a job as a security officer, making
approximately $40,000 annually and, upon retirement, he began
taking his retirement benefits. 192 His pension began providing almost $4000 a month, and he had a balance of about $347,000 in his

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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federal Thrift Savings Plan account (“TSP account”). 193 Postdivorce, Scott remarried a woman who worked with the Secret Service and they shared expenses. 194 The new wife even assisted Scott
with his spousal support payments in 2013. 195
After the divorce, Julie gained employment as a “paraprofessional” at an elementary school, earning approximately $15,800
per year. 196 Julie’s earning capacity was limited, however, by the
fact that she suffered from congenital nystagmus, making reading
difficult and limiting her distance vision. 197 This condition prevented her from spending too much time in front of a computer
screen and precluded her from driving after sundown. 198 Julie also
suffered from other health problems and was diagnosed with
breast cancer in August 2010. 199 She underwent a mastectomy in
September 2010 but did not complete the chemical treatment until
late 2015. 200
Soon after Scott’s retirement, he filed a motion to reduce his
spousal support payments based on his change in circumstances,
requesting that his payments be reduced from $3100 to approximately $2300. 201 The trial court held a hearing and, based on “extensive evidence,” denied Scott’s request. 202 An appeal followed and
Scott was similarly unable to persuade the appellate court. 203 The
appellate court stated that, from the outset, the PSA “stipulated
that appellant’s retirement would constitute a material change.” 204
The only issue, therefore, was whether the trial court erred in concluding that the change “did not warrant a reduction in the amount
of spousal support.” 205
In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the appellate court concluded that the trial court had properly considered the relevant

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4–5.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7–8.
Id. at *8.
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statutory factors. 206 A factor of particular importance to the trial
court, the appellate court noted, was that Julie had been “a stayat-home mother” while Scott “consistently worked long hours” during his career. 207 “Appellee ceased pursuing her own career and
was the primary caregiver to the parties’ children, managing the
day-to-day events in the household almost entirely by herself.” 208
Consequently, Julie’s employment prospects were limited and her
health problems intensified her limitations. 209 Another important
factor was Scott’s financial position, including the fact that he was
remarried and sharing expenses, as well as income, with his new
spouse. 210 The appellate court concluded, accordingly, that the trial
court was correct in finding that Scott still retained the ability to
pay the spousal support. 211 Like in the Davis case, then, a reduction in income did not result in a spousal support reduction because
there was no showing that the payor was not able to meet the obligation. 212
III. CHILDREN
A. Child Support
1. Significant Legislative Activity
This year, the legislature passed new bills—House Bill 1360 213
and Senate Bill 982 214—that now require child support guideline
worksheets to be placed in either the court or the Department of
Social Services file. This rule also requires that the parties each

206. Id. at *11 (analyzing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(E) (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Supp. 2017)).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at *11–12.
210. Id. at *12; see also Driscoll v. Hunter, 59 Va. App. 22, 34, 716 S.E.2d 477, 482 (2011)
(stating that spousal support is not automatically reduced merely because a payor-spouse
must “draw from other sources, such as the principal of investment or savings accounts”);
Davis v. Davis, No. 0703-17-4, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 313 (Dec. 12, 2017) (unpublished decision) (finding that trial court does not have to reduce spousal support if husband has to draw
from non-wage assets or reduce the principal of investments).
211. Giambattista, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 63, at *12.
212. See id. at *12–14.
213. Act of Feb. 26, 2018, ch. 22, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-108.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
214. Act of Mar. 2, 2018, ch. 10, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-108.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
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receive a copy of the guideline worksheet. 215 This new rule is meant
to ensure that, in the event of modification or enforcement motions,
all parties can refer to the basis for the original child support
award. 216
2. Significant Judicial Decisions
In the realm of child support cases, most of the courtroom activity involved requests to modify. For example, in Nashnoush v.
Yousef, a father sought to modify his child support payments downward after a change in employment. 217 Abdul Nashnoush (“Abdul”)
and Asma Yousef (“Asma”) divorced in May 2016 and the final decree provided that Abdul would pay his ex-spouse $2355 monthly
in child support for twelve months beginning May 1, 2016, $2255
per month for twenty-four months beginning May 1, 2017, and
then $2237 per month “for as long as a child support obligation
exists for three children, or until there is a material change in circumstances that results in a further order of the Court.” 218 The decree also included language about the modifiability of the agreement:
The parties jointly acknowledge that Husband suffered a stroke in
February 2016 and is currently in rehabilitation. Husband was placed
on short term disability beginning April 1, 2016, and will be receiving
a maximum of 60% of his income for the duration of the disability benefit. Husband anticipates returning to full time employment in May
2016; however, his inability to do so shall be considered a material
change in circumstance and the court shall have the authority to hold
an evidentiary hearing to review the change and make any adjustments it deems appropriate retroactive to the date he provided Wife
with written notice of the inability to return to regular employment. 219

Only a month after the final decree was issued, Abdul filed a petition to reduce child support, stating that his employment had been
terminated after he told his employer that he needed reasonable
accommodations for his health. 220 During the trial regarding his
request, Abdul testified that prior to his termination, he had been
215.
216.
217.
sion).
218.
219.
220.

VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
See id. § 20-108.2(A)–(B) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
No. 1768-16-4, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 190, at *4 (Aug. 1, 2017) (unpublished deciId. at *2.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *4.

TAIT 531 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

10/18/2018 8:54 AM

FAMILY LAW

105

the “vice-president and head of national sales for [an] Islamic home
finance provider.” 221 In 2014, he earned $310,000, and in 2015 he
earned $325,000. 222 Abdul also explained that, prior to his termination in 2016, his employer had given him two options. 223 One option was a severance package worth $170,000 with a signed oneyear noncompete provision. 224 The other option was to take a job in
Kentucky as an “area manager.” 225 He would earn his same salary
for the first year in Kentucky, and after that, would earn a lower
salary in line with the decreased responsibility. 226 Abdul declined
both offers and “found a job as vice-president with a competitor,”
earning substantially less than he had been with a base salary of
$120,000 per year. 227 Abdul would, however, have the opportunity
to earn bonuses in the future. 228 To support her case for no reduction in support, Yousef presented evidence from a vocational expert
who stated that Abdul was “underemployed and that his earning
capacity was approximately $240,000.” 229 Ultimately, the circuit
court found that there was “a material change in circumstances,
but that modification of child and spousal support was not warranted” because Abdul was “voluntarily underemployed.” 230 “And
when you’re voluntarily underemployed,” the circuit court declared, “the court is not going to reduce [your] income or [your] obligations that [you] agreed to in this calendar year, less than six
months ago.” 231 The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the
evidence supported the trial court findings. 232
B. Parenting and Adoption
One adoption case this year stands out as interesting and important—Geouge v. Traylor. 233 The case, involving an adoption
against the wishes of the birth mother, engaged the court in a
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at *5 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at *5–6.
See id.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *9–10.
68 Va. App. 343, 808 S.E.2d 541 (2017).
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lengthy analysis of the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) alongside application of the adoption rules. 234
Jocelyn Geouge (“Jocelyn”), the mother in question, is the biological mother of L.T., her child with the father, Jason Traylor (“Jason”). 235 Jocelyn had a long and difficult history with pain medication that led to her frequent incarceration. 236 She was “convicted of
prescription fraud in late 2013 and again in March 2014. 237 Not
long after, she was convicted of breaking and entering, several
counts of larceny, and illegal possession of drugs.” 238 In February
2015, she was sentenced to a total of ten years and sixty months,
with all but one year and three months suspended and credit
granted for time already served. 239 On February 18, 2015, while
incarcerated, “the corrections medical unit informed [Jocelyn that
she] was pregnant.” 240 Jocelyn was released under six months later
and was promptly convicted of identity fraud and obtaining drugs
using a false name. 241 This resulted in a prison sentence, the bulk
of it suspended except for six months. 242
Because her pregnancy was high-risk, Jocelyn was placed on
house arrest, but when she failed a drug-screening test, she was
incarcerated. 243 While incarcerated, she gave birth to the child in
question. 244 Jason, the father, at that point, stated he was willing
to take the child. 245 The child was transferred to the father, but he
quickly filed a “Petition to Accept Consent for Adoption and Transfer Custody,” requesting the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court to accept his consent for an adoptive family, the Griffiths, to
adopt the baby. 246 Jocelyn subsequently filed a motion to stay, invoking the ICWA and “asserting that [Jocelyn’s] father was ‘known
by the family to be of Cherokee descent,’ but making no represen-

234. Id. at 347, 808 S.E.2d at 542 (analyzing 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1923 (2012)).
235. Id. at 347, 808 S.E.2d at 542.
236. See id. at 347–41, 808 S.E.2d at 543.
237. Id. at 347–48, 808 S.E.2d at 543.
238. Id. at 348, 808 S.E.2d at 543.
239. Id. at 348, 808 S.E.2d at 543.
240. Id. at 348, 808 S.E.2d at 543.
241. Id. at 348, 808 S.E.2d at 543.
242. Id. at 348, 808 S.E.2d at 543.
243. Id. at 348, 808 S.E.2d at 543.
244. Id. at 348, 808 S.E.2d at 543.
245. Id. at 348, 808 S.E.2d at 543.
246. Id. at 349, 808 S.E.2d at 544–45.
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tation that either he or [Jocelyn] were members of a federally recognized Cherokee tribe.” 247 The circuit court denied the stay after
concluding that Jocelyn had not met the requirement of proving
that the child was a member or eligible to be a member of a federally recognized tribe. 248 The burden of proof, the court noted, was
on Jocelyn to show that the ICWA applied. 249
The circuit court next held a hearing over two days “to address
whether [Jocelyn] was withholding her consent to the adoption
contrary to the best interests of L.T.” 250 Mrs. Griffith testified
about how the child was healthy and engaged, “playing cook, reading, taking walks, and occasional play dates.” 251 The father testified that, while he had planned on parenting, he quickly “realized
he would not be capable when also raising the other children.” 252
He testified to the state of Jocelyn’s home and her lifestyle: “He
testified to observing fentanyl patches, empty pill capsules, and
liquor at the residence.” 253 Additionally, “[h]e commented on the
condition of Geouge’s mother’s house when they resided there, noting that it had rotted wood, missing bricks, and mold.” 254 He also
testified to Jocelyn’s violent temper and acts toward him, as well
as the fact that she “inappropriately consumed cough syrup and
had pawned some of the children’s toys.” 255 Based on the totality of
this and other testimony, the circuit court concluded that Jocelyn
was withholding her consent to the adoption contrary to the best
interests of the child. 256 The adoption could, therefore, go forward. 257 Jocelyn filed a motion to reconsider that the circuit court
denied; the adoption was finalized, and this appeal ensued. 258
The two major issues the Court of Appeals of Virginia analyzed
were the application of the ICWA and whether the lower court had
properly determined that Jocelyn’s withholding her consent to the

247. Id. at 351, 808 S.E.2d at 544–45.
248. Id. at 352, 808 S.E.2d at 545.
249. Id. at 352, 808 S.E.2d at 545.
250. Id. at 352, 808 S.E.2d at 545.
251. Id. at 352, 808 S.E.2d at 545.
252. Id. at 353, 808 S.E.2d at 545.
253. Id. at 353, 808 S.E.2d at 545.
254. Id. at 353, 808 S.E.2d at 545. “He acknowledged that he could not say whether there
had been improvements made after he moved out.” Id. at 353, 808 S.E.2d at 545.
255. Id. at 353, 808 S.E.2d at 545–46.
256. Id. at 358, 808 S.E.2d at 548.
257. Id. at 358, 808 S.E.2d at 548.
258. Id. at 358–59, 808 S.E.2d at 548.
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adoption had been contrary to the best interests of the child. 259 The
court of appeals began with an examination of the ICWA, which it
noted had been enacted in 1978 “to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal
standards for the removal of Indian children from their families.” 260 The general rule, the court stated, was that the party seeking the protection of the statute bore the burden of demonstrating
its applicability. 261 “Despite this [rule],” the court continued, “[W]e
disagree with the[] assertion that the invoking party must ‘prove’
that the child is an ‘Indian child’ before any provisions of the Act
are implicated.” 262 The court remarked that “recently adopted regulations implementing the Act” do not require actual proof that the
child is a tribe member or eligible to be one. 263 The standard, instead, is whether or not the person invoking the ICWA knows or
has “reason to know.” 264 All that was required of Jocelyn, then, was
to “assert in good faith a belief that the child ‘is an “Indian
child.”” 265 The problem was, the court concluded, that neither Jocelyn nor “her counsel ever made such an assertion.” 266 The ICWA
argument, therefore, failed. 267
The court of appeals also addressed the circuit court’s determination that the adoption going forth without Jocelyn’s consent had
been in the best interest of the child. 268 Best interest in the adoption context, the court commented, differed from best interest in a
custody case because of the gravity of the terminating a parental
relationship. 269 In the adoption context, the trial court was to consider both the interests of the parent as well as the child. 270 Adopting this baseline of serious inquiry into the needs and capacities of
259. Id. at 359–60, 808 S.E.2d at 549.
260. Id. at 360–61, 808 S.E.2d at 549 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2012)).
261. Id. at 363, 808 S.E.2d at 550.
262. Id. at 364, 808 S.E.2d at 551.
263. Id. at 365, 808 S.E.2d at 551.
264. Id. at 363–64 n.6, 808 S.E.2d at 551 n.6.
265. Id. at 367, 808 S.E.2d at 552.
266. Id. at 367, 808 S.E.2d at 552.
267. Id. at 368, 808 S.E.2d at 553.
268. Id. at 368–69, 371, 808 S.E.2d at 553–54.
269. Id. at 370, 808 S.E.2d at 554 (“[[T]he statutory requirements] encompass far more
than mere consideration of the child’s best interests as defined in cases involving a contest
between natural parents.” (first alteration in original)).
270. Id. at 370, 808 S.E.2d at 555.
[I]n determining whether the valid consent of any person whose consent is required is withheld contrary to the best interests of the child . . . , the circuit
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both the parent and child, the appellate court observed that the
circuit court had “heard the testimony of more than twenty witnesses over the course of a two-day trial.” 271 “In addition to the testimony, more than thirty exhibits, ranging from medical records to
home visit reports, were admitted and reviewed by the circuit
court.” 272 Jocelyn did not challenge any of the findings that the
court made based on all of the evidence; rather, she challenged the
ultimate conclusion, arguing that the circuit court “failed to fully
appreciate” her recovery and progress. 273
The appellate court’s response was this: “This argument misunderstands our role on appeal.” 274 “Although the circuit court could
have made different factual findings regarding the statutory factors or weighed the significance of the factors differently, nothing
in the statutory scheme required it to do so.” 275 The circuit court
exercised its discretion appropriately in making all the relevant
determinations, the appellate court stated—adding that, “[e]ven if
we might have rendered different factual findings or weighed the
statutory factors differently, we will not second-guess the circuit
court’s exercise of judgment regarding the statutory factors.” 276
The Griffiths’ adoption of the child stood. 277

court or juvenile and domestic relations district court, as the case may be, shall
consider whether granting the petition pending before it would be in the best
interest of the child. The circuit court or juvenile and domestic relations district
court, as the case may be, shall consider all relevant factors, including the birth
parent(s)’ efforts to obtain or maintain legal and physical custody of the child;
whether the birth parent(s) are currently willing and able to assume full custody of the child; whether the birth parent(s)’ efforts to assert parental rights
were thwarted by other people; the birth parent(s)’ ability to care for the child;
the age of the child; the quality of any previous relationship between the birth
parent(s) and the child and between the birth parent(s) and any other minor
children; the duration and suitability of the child’s present custodial environment; and the effect of a change of physical custody on the child.
Id. at 369, 808 S.E.2d at 553–54 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1205 (Repl. Vol. 2017 & Cum.
Supp. 2018)).
271. Id. at 370–71, 808 S.E.2d at 554.
272. Id. at 371, 808 S.E.2d at 554.
273. Id. at 371–72, 808 S.E.2d at 554–55.
274. Id. at 372, 808 S.E.2d at 555.
275. Id. at 372, 808 S.E.2d at 555.
276. Id. at 372, 808 S.E.2d at 555.
277. Id. at 372, 808 S.E.2d at 555.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Virginia courts at every level continue to grapple
with claims about marriage, divorce, and parenting. These claims
concern procedures around entry into marriage, financial sharing
and disclosure between spouses, and the right to parent. These
claims, more broadly, reflect new patterns in economic partnership, continuing questions about what one spouse owes to another,
and what constitutes the marital relationship.

